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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SEX OFFENSES AND FREE
SPEECH: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BAN ON SEX
OFFENDERS’ USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA: IMPACT ON STATES
WITH SIMILAR RESTRICTIONS
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017)
ABSTRACT
In Packingham v. North Carolina, the United States Supreme Court
held that a North Carolina statute, which barred registered sex offenders
from accessing a myriad of websites, including social networking websites,
impermissibly restricts lawful speech in violation of the First Amendment’s
Free Speech Clause, applicable to the States under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court illustrated its decision under the
Constitution as well as through its precedents. In reaching its decision, the
Court noted two main reasons for the statute’s impermissibility. First, the
statute’s broad wording not only restricts access to social media websites,
but due to the statute’s elements, it encompasses many and varying websites. Second, the Court found that this far reaching restriction on speech is
unprecedented in the range of speech that it is abridging; essentially resulting in a total ban on the exercise of First Amendment speech on social networking sites that are imperative to participating in modern society.
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I.

FACTS

Under North Carolina law, it was a felony for a registered sex offender
“to access a commercial social networking Web site where the sex offender
knows that the site permits minor children to become members or to create
or maintain personal web pages on the commercial social networking Web
site.”1 North Carolina’s statute bans registered sex offenders from Web
sites that meet four requirements.2 First, if the Web site is “operated by a
person who derives revenue from membership fees, advertising, or other

1. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1733 (2017) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 14-202.5(a), (e) (West 2015)).
2. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1733 (quoting § 14-202.5(b)).
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sources related to the operation of the Web site.”3 Second, if it “[f]acilitates
the social introduction between two or more persons for the purposes of
friendship, meeting other persons, or information exchanges.”4 Third, if it
“[a]llows users to create Web pages or personal profiles that contain information such as the name or nickname of the user, photographs placed on
the personal Web page by the user, other personal information about the user, and links to other personal Web pages on the commercial social networking Web site of friends or associates of the user that may be accessed
by other users or visitors to the Web site.”5 And fourth, if it “[p]rovides users or visitors to the commercial social networking Web site mechanisms to
communicate with other users, such as a message board, chat room, electronic mail, or instant messenger.”6
In 2002, Petitioner, Lester Gerard Packingham, a 21-year-old student,
had sex with a 13-year-old girl.7 Subsequently, Packingham was charged
and pleaded guilty to “taking indecent liberties with a child.”8 Under North
Carolina law, Packingham’s crime qualified as “an offense against a minor,” which carried with it the requirement to register as a sex offender – “a
status that can endure for 30 years or more.”9
In 2010, after having a parking ticket dismissed, Packingham posted an
exclamatory status to his Facebook account, stating:
Man God is Good! How about I got so much favor they dismissed
the ticket before court even started? No fine, no court cost, no
nothing spent……Praise be to GOD, WOW! Thanks JESUS!10
Per North Carolina law, Packingham’s above quoted statement on Facebook was in violation of N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5 (2015).11 As
a registered sex offender, Packingham was banned from accessing commercial social networking sites.12 Packingham’s statement posted to Facebook
was spotted by a police officer employed by the Durham Police Department
who was investigating registered sex offenders who were suspected to have
3. Id. at 1733-34.
4. Id. at 1734.
5. Id.
6. § 14-202.5(b)(4).
7. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1734.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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been violating § 14-202.5.13 Packingham’s personal Facebook account was
under the name “J.R.Gerrard,” and after the police officer cross-referenced
recent court records, the officer confirmed that Packingham had recently
had a traffic ticket dismissed.14 Subsequent to a search warrant, evidence
was uncovered to prove that “J.R. Gerrard” was in fact Lester Packingham,
a registered sex offender, who was accessing a social media website in violation of § 14-202.5.15
Packingham was indicted by a grand jury for violating § 14-202.5.16
Packingham sought to have the indictment dismissed on First Amendment
grounds, but it was denied.17 Packingham was convicted in state court even
though the State, at no point, alleged that Packingham had committed any
crime while on the internet.18
On appeal to the Court of Appeals of North Carolina, Packingham argued that § 14-202.5 violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.19 The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court; holding that § 14202.5 “is not narrowly tailored to serve the State’s legitimate interest in protecting minors from sexual abuse.”20 However, the North Carolina Supreme Court ultimately reversed.21 That court found that § 14-202.5 did not
violate the First Amendment, but was “constitutional in all respects.”22 Further finding that the law was merely a “limitation on conduct,” not a limitation of speech.23 The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted
certiorari.24
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Both historically and as of late, laws applicable to registered sex offenders have been among the most controversial. Even more compelling is
how these laws intersect with the First Amendment and social media. As
stated by the Court, Packingham is “one of the first this Court has taken to
address the relationship between the First Amendment and the modern In13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1734.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1734.
Id. at 1734-35.
Id. at 1735.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ternet.”25 The Court illustrated its analysis and decision through precedents
and statistics supporting the prevalence of social media in modern society.26
A. THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
In pertinent part the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”27
At issue in Packingham is the Free Speech provision of the First
Amendment. If a law functions to regulate or interfere with an individual’s
right to free speech, a state must show that it has either a significant or
compelling interest that it’s regulation will achieve in furthering.28 The interest a state must prove hinges on which level of scrutiny the Court will
examine the law under.29 Specifically, if a law is content-based, namely, if
the law distinguishes between the content of speech on its face, the law will
be subject to strict scrutiny.30 Alternatively, if a regulation of speech
“serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression,” that regulation is
subject to intermediate scrutiny.31
Furthermore, a state may enact regulations on speech if the law merely
regulates the place or time speech may be made regardless of the content of
the speech.32 The United States Supreme Court has examined laws under
the intermediate scrutiny standard if such law was a time, place, or manner
regulation.33 A content-neutral time, place, or manner regulation on speech
may be upheld if it is “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest and . . . [it] leave[s] open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.”34 A law is narrowly tailored if it does not “burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s
legitimate interests.”35
25. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736.
26. See id. at 1735-38.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
28. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2748-49 (1989).
29. Id.
30. See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2522-23 (2014).
31. Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2754.
32. See id. at 2757-58.
33. Id.
34. Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2753 (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
35. See McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2523 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct.
2746, 2534-40 (1989)).
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B. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PRIOR TO THE MODERN INTERNET
Historically, the Court has made clear that First Amendment speech is
protected within certain public physical spaces, such as parks.36 Specifically, in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Court upheld a New York City’s
restriction on the volume of a rock performance in Central Park; finding
that the restriction was a permissible time, place, and manner restriction that
did not discriminate based on content.37 In Ward, the Court explained that
New York City’s regulation was narrowly tailored to serve its substantial
and content-neutral interest in controlling volume, and the tranquility of
private homes, which satisfied intermediate scrutiny.38 Further, the Court
noted that governmental protection in no way is limited to that context, but
the government may seek to protect “even such traditional public forums as
city streets and parks.”39 Twenty-eight years after Ward, the Court determined that physical places such as city streets and parks remain important
spaces to gather and express views, but now, it is clear that the most important place for exchanging views, and protesting others, is the Internet.40
C. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE MODERN INTERNET
In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, the First Amendment was
introduced to the modern Internet.41 In that case, the Court struck down
two provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996; specifically,
provisions that were designed to protect minors from “obscene or indecent”
communications on the Internet.42 The Court explained that said provisions
were content-based restrictions on speech, and overly broad because the law
prohibited unprotected as well as protected speech.43 Further, the Court determined that “the growth of the Internet has been and continues to be phenomenal.”44 As such, the Court stressed the importance of the freedom of
expression in a democratic society – in “the vast democratic fora of the Internet.”45 For these reasons, the Court found the law unconstitutional.46

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2756 (1989).
Id. at 2760.
Id. at 2756.
Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735.
See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 (1997).
Id. at 2351.
Id. at 2342.
Id. at 2351.
Id. at 2343.
Id. at 2351.
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Twenty years have since passed since the ruling in Reno v. American
Civil Liberties Union, where the Court predicted the phenomenal growth of
the Internet.47 Today, in 2018, 81% of the United States population holds a
social media account.48 Additionally, approximately 185 million Americans used social media in 2016, a number predicted to reach 200 million
people by the year 2020.49 The Court used similar statistics to describe the
prevalence and utility of social media in today’s modern culture to depict
how individuals take to his or her social media account to “engage in a wide
array of protected First Amendment activity.”50 Facebook serves as an outlet to discuss religion and politics with friends, as well as a forum to share
other personal thoughts and images.51 LinkedIn can be used as a tool to
network with professionals in an individual’s field of work, or to receive
employment openings or advice.52 Twitter is a forum to follow political
leaders, where an individual could petition the same, and engage in a myriad of activity.53 As such, the Court discussed how the “Cyber Age is a revolution of historic proportions,” stating: “The forces and directions of the
Internet are so new, so protean, and so far reaching that courts must be conscious that what they say today might be obsolete tomorrow.”54
Subsequently, Packingham is one of the first cases the Court has decided to address the First Amendment and the modern Internet.55 Given the
enormous impact that social media has on our society’s culture, the Court
proceeded with “extreme caution” as to not suggest that the First Amendment provides little protection to United States citizens wishing to participate in that space.56
III. ANALYSIS
In Packingham v. North Carolina, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that § 14-202.5 could not stand because the statute’s broad wording
not only barred registered sex offenders from social media websites, but al-

47. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2351 (1997).
48. Percentage of U.S. population with a social media profile 2008-2017 STATISTA (Aug. 9,
2017, 7:44 PM), https://www.statista.com/statistics/273476/percentage-of-us-population-with-asocial-network-profile/.
49. Id.
50. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735-36 (2017).
51. Id. at 1735.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1736.
55. Id.
56. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736.
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so encompassed a vast array of unrelated websites.57 This far reaching restriction on protected speech, which is unprecedented in its scope, could not
satisfy even intermediate scrutiny.58 Overall, the Court concluded that §
14-202.5 violated the Constitution.59 Lastly, the Court considered the
State’s argument; specifically, the law’s important and preventative purpose
of protecting minors from registered sex offenders, but found that the State
did not meet its burden to show that the law is “necessary or legitimate to
serve that purpose.”60
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION: NORTH CAROLINA STATUTE § 14-202.5
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

On June 19, 2017, the Supreme Court unanimously decided Packingham v. North Carolina in favor of the Petitioner.61 Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion for the majority.62 Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor,
and Kagan joined in the majority opinion.63
1.

American Revolution

The Court relied on its prior decisions to illustrate its ruling.64 McCullen v. Coakly stands for the proposition that in order to survive intermediate
scrutiny, a law must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.”65 Further, McCullen provides that “the law must not burden
substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interest.”66 The Court made certain to note that a state, without
doubt, has an interest in protecting children and other victims of sexual assault from abuse, and that the “sexual abuse of a child is a most serious
crime”; however, that interest is not exempt from all constitutional protections.67
The Court went on to explain “that for centuries now, inventions heralded as advances in human progress have been exploited by the criminal
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1736.
59. Id. at 1738.
60. Id.
61. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1733. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id., 137 S. Ct. at 1735-38.
65. Id. at 1736 (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2534 (2014)).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1736 (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002)).
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mind.”68 Essentially the Court demonstrated how our society is continuously changing and adapting, thus the Court needed to adapt with it by considering advances in science and the social context.69 In Packingham, the
Court was given the task of protecting minors, while simultaneously protecting individual’s First Amendment rights in light of today’s moral, political and cultural climate.70 Packingham is a novelty, and the Court noted
that its prior cases and legislative history may not show the actual extent of
the application of the First Amendment to the new frontier of the Internet.71
2.

Overbreadth

Furthermore, the Court agreed that a State may enact specific, narrowly
tailored laws to prevent a sex offender from engaging in criminal conduct;
however, North Carolina’s law banning registered sex offenders from social
media websites was so broad that the Court determined that it was unprecedented in the scope of protected speech it abridges.72
Given the wording and construction of § 14-202.5, North Carolina’s
law banned not only Facebook, but a myriad of websites, such as
Webmd.com, which have nothing to do with the State’s purported interest
of protecting minors from sex offenders gathering his or her personal information.73 Again, the Court stressed that this opinion should not be read
as a bar on states enacting specific laws to prevent criminal behavior.74 Rather, the Court stressed that the law just must be more narrowly tailored
than § 14-202.5.75 As illustrated in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court struck
down the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act, which made it a crime to advocate for violence, as unconstitutional.76 In Brandenburg, the Petitioner, a
member of the Ku Klux Klan, challenged Ohio’s law on First Amendment
grounds.77 Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Petitioner,
holding that the law violated the Petitioner’s right to free speech.78 Even
so, in that case, the Court made certain that “[s]pecific criminal acts are not

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 1737.
Id.
See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737.
Id.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 89 S. Ct. 1827, 1830 (1969).
Id. at 1828.
Id. at 1830.
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protected speech even if speech is the means for their commission.”79 The
same guidance was given in Packingham.80
As such, the Court found that North Carolina’s law did not punish specific criminal acts, but barred sex offenders from engaging in protected
speech on social media completely.81 As stated before, social media today
functions as a device to share ideas, religious views, and access to United
States elected officials.82 Given the same, if that access was denied, the
Court stated that it would be comparable to denying that same individual
the right to speak in public streets or parks.83
In general, the State’s argument centered on the importance of keeping
minors and victims of sexual abuse safe.84 The State argued that § 14-202.5
was merely a content-neutral, time, place or manner restriction, subject to
intermediate scrutiny.85 Further, the State argued that § 14-202.5 set out
four requirements, as to only limit sex offenders from accessing websites
where he or she could use minor’s personal information in order to target
them.86 The Court, even assuming that the above arguments were true,
could not let the law stand.87
3.

Majority’s Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court ruled the North Carolina statute
unconstitutional.88 Because § 14-202.5 impermissibly restricted lawful
speech in violation of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause, the Court
struck it down as unconstitutional.89 Additionally, the Court considered the
Respondents’ arguments related to prevention, and found them nonetheless
unpersuasive.90
B. THE CONCURRING OPINION
Even though the Court was unanimous in its decision to strike down §
14-202.5, Justices Alito, Roberts, and Thomas joined and authored a con79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737.
See Brandenburg, 89 S. Ct. at 1827.
Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737.
See id.
Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735.
Id. at 1737.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1736.
Id. at 1738.
Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738.
Id. at 1737.
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currence.91 The concurring opinion was in agreement about North Carolina’s law’s “staggering reach,” stating that § 14-202.5 barred sex offenders
from websites that could not reasonably lead to the abuse of minors.92
However, where the three concurring justices could not agree with the
majority is when its rhetoric compared the Internet to public streets and
parks.93 Most significantly, the concurrence warned that some may interpret the majority’s language to mean that the State may not be able to restrict sex offenders from any websites or regulate speech on the Internet.94
In retrospect, Justice Alito’s statement, “I am troubled by the implications
of the Court’s unnecessary rhetoric,”95 may have been foreshadowing to the
challenges that sex offenders are likely, and already have brought against
their states’ laws restricting his or her access to the modern Internet.
IV. IMPACT
The Packingham v. North Carolina ruling may have an impact on
states with similar restrictions on sex offenders. The Packingham decision
has already been cited and used to challenge a probation condition in United
States v. Rock.96 In that case, Defendant was charged and pleaded guilty to
one count of distribution of child pornography.97 The crime leading to Defendant’s charge was the fact that Defendant took pictures of then girlfriend’s eleven-year-old daughter naked, and distributed them on the internet.98 Subsequently, the Defendant took an appeal to challenge the length
of his sentence and the conditions of his release.99 Here, the Defendant argued that the condition he not possess or use a computer, goes against the
Court’s ruling in Packingham v. North Carolina.100 The D.C. Court found
this argument unpersuasive because the Defendant’s release condition was
not a post-custodial restriction as was in Packingham.101 Further, that court
stated, “a court granting probation may impose reasonable conditions that
deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.”102
91. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738 (Alito, J., concurring).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. United States v. Rock, 863 F.3d 827, 831 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
97. Id. at 829.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 831.
101. Id.
102. Rock, 863 F.3d at 831 (quoting United States v. Knights, 122 S. Ct. 587, 591 (2001)).
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As illustrated above, the warning from Justice Alito, who wrote for the
concurrence in Packingham, may already be proving true.103 North Dakota
imposes restrictions on sex offenders that are similar to the one challenged
in United States v. Rock.104 As such, it is likely that North Dakota defendants will use Packingham’s decision to challenge such restrictions.
A. NORTH DAKOTA PROBATION CONDITIONS APPLIED TO SEX
OFFENDERS
In North Dakota, a sex offender is subject to probation conditions at a
judge’s discretion.105 Specifically, a judge may impose that a registered sex
offender “must not subscribe to any Internet service provider, by modem,
LAN, DSL or any other manner.”106 Furthermore, the judge may order that
such an individual, “may not use another person’s Internet or use Internet
through any commercial venue until and unless approved in writing by [a]
parole/probation officer.”107
Like the challenge in United States v. Rock, North Dakota defendants
may challenge such a restriction on First Amendment grounds.108 It is likely that a North Dakota Court would render a similar decision as the Rock
Court. However, it is impossible to say with certainty.
B. PACKINGHAM’S EFFECTS ON NORTH DAKOTA SPECIFIC LAWS
In the 2003 case of State v. Backlund,109 the North Dakota Supreme
Court considered a constitutional challenge to N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20.05,
which makes it a crime for an adult to lure minors by computer or other
electronic means.110 In that case, the defendant argued that North Dakota’s
law violates the free speech provisions of the federal and state constitutions.111 Interestingly, the defendant used a similar legal argument as the
petitioner in Packingham.112 In Backlund, the defendant declared that
North Dakota’s law was overbroad, as there was no communication to a
minor, and that it was a content-based restriction on his right to free speech,

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1738 (2017).
See N.D.R.Crim.P. Form 9.
See id.
N.D.R.Crim.P. Form 9.
Id.
See United States v. Rock, 863 F.3d 827, 831 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
State v. Backlund, 2003 ND 184, ¶ 1, 672 N.W.2d 431.
Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-05.1.
Id. ¶ 18, 672 N.W.2d at 438.
See id.
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and not narrowly tailored to serve the states legitimate interest.113 However, the North Dakota Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument,
finding that § 12.1-20-05.1 does not violate the free speech clause of the
state and federal constitutions.114 The Court reasoned that North Dakota’s
law does not allow for prosecution of “pure” speech, but merely criminalizes conduct directed at “luring” and abusing minors.115
After Packingham, North Dakota may see similar challenges to its laws
and restrictions placed on sex offenders, and perhaps the North Dakota Supreme Court’s conclusion will be different than in Backlund. However,
North Dakota’s law is more narrowly tailored than the law in North Carolina, and its restrictions are placed on registered sex offenders still under supervision, not post-supervision.116 Although, after the ruling in Packingham, it is impossible to state with certainty which direction the North
Dakota Supreme Court would go after fourteen years since the ruling in
Backlund. Ultimately, the future impact of Packingham is difficult to predict because the “[t]he forces and directions of the Internet are so new, so
protean, and so far-reaching that courts must be conscious that what they
say today might be obsolete tomorrow.”117
V. CONCLUSION
Overall, in Packingham v. North Carolina, the United States Supreme
Court struck down a North Carolina law barring registered sex offenders
from accessing social networking websites (and because of the law’s broad
language, a myriad of other web sites as well) as unconstitutional.118 Packingham is one of the first modern Internet cases decided by the Court, so its
holding will likely have an impact on other states with similar laws or restrictions, including North Dakota.119
Katie Miller*

113. Id. ¶ 18, 672 N.W.2d at 438.
114. Id. ¶ 32, 672 N.W.2d at 442.
115. Backlund, ¶ 32, 672 N.W.2d at 442.
116. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-05.1.
117. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017).
118. Id. at 1737.
119. See id. at 1732.
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